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The Comparative Decline 
and Revitalization Processes 
of Hartford and Detroit
Jane Bisson
To some, Detroit, Michigan and Hartford, Connecticut may simply 
appear to be two struggling and impoverished cities with little 
potential. However, both cities hold within themselves a thriving 
past and strong future potential. Hartford and Detroit are desirable 
cities for the comparison of deindustrialization and revitalization 
for several reasons. First, their experience with deindustrialization 
occurred around the same time period. Detroit is a bit larger than 
Hartford, with a population of over 680,000 versus about 126,000.1 
However, their similar experiences with deindustrialization, and job 
loss due to globalization, as well as similar strategies for urban renewal 
make them desirable for comparability. The experiences of Detroit 
and Hartford, both similar and different, illustrate the ways in which 
cities in the future may prevent or lessen their economic and social 
decline. The deindustrialization processes of both cities indicate the 
vital importance of an urban economy that thrives off of not one, but 
several different bases. Secondly, these case studies illustrate the best 
and worst strategies of urban revitalization. Both suggest that the most 
successful revitalization strategies are ones that encourage people 
to not only visit the city, but also to live there. To do this, projects 
must intend to interact with the city in a way that encourages an 
integrated experience for both tourist and resident alike. With the goal 
of producing a balance of interested tourists and happy residents in 
downtown, urban renewal strategies can ultimately produce happier, 
stronger and more thriving metropolises. 
The Rise and Fall of Detroit and Hartford
 In order to understand the goals of urban revitalization, it is 
necessary to understand both what the problems are, as well as the roots 
of those problems. The histories of both Hartford and Detroit tell a story 
of a once thriving city that has since been unable to regain its former 
glory. Both cities were once industrial hubs, and both lost their primary 
economic base due to increasing cost and international competition. 
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Now, both cities have impoverished populations and limited urban 
resources. Though the cities differ in several ways, among which 
include size, population demographics and urban services, Hartford 
and Detroit are two cities in dire need of revitalization. Together their 
demises, coupled with their current attempts at urban reinvention, 
illustrate strategies for both the prevention of such dramatic erosion 
of economic bases, as well as strategies of urban reinvention. 
 Hartford was once a thriving city that today is struggling to 
regain its former glory. Similar to Detroit, Hartford experienced a 
boom in industry beginning in the early twentieth century. Large 
corporations, such as insurance companies, began to invest in Hartford 
and set up large-scale insurance businesses in the area.2 Still today 
insurance companies are one of the major jobs providers in Hartford. 
Hartford’s workforce as a whole was well educated in manufacturing, 
thereby attracting major manufacturing companies such as Pope 
Manufacturing, an automobile manufacturer, as well as Royal and 
Underwood, both typewriter manufacturers.3 Equally, if not more 
importantly to Hartford’s booming industrial age, was the arrival of 
Pratt & Whitney, an aerospace manufacturer.4 Pratt and Whitney, 
later with another location in East Hartford, became so important 
to Hartford’s economy that by World War II it employed more than 
25,000 workers.5 Additionally, the Colt Firearms factory provided 
manufacturing jobs and contributed to Hartford’s thriving industrial 
economy.6 The population of Hartford boomed, attracting immigrants 
to fulfill the rising demand for labor in the area. Hartford reached its 
highest population during the manufacturing boom after World War II, 
rising rapidly from 164,072 to 177,397 between 1940 and 1950.7 By the 
1950s, Hartford was a robust industrial powerhouse, providing over 
30,000 manufacturing jobs.8 This prosperity was short lived, however, 
as the industrial base of Hartford rapidly shrunk, causing the number 
of jobs provided by manufacturing to plummet to just 20,000 in 1970.9
 Hartford experienced a period of rapid deindustrialization, due 
to foreign competition and increasing manufacturing costs. By the 
1970s, not only did the number of jobs provided by the manufacturing 
industry decline dramatically, the racial demographics of the city also 
rapidly changed. New Deal reforms that encouraged the purchasing of 
single family homes, white flight and red-lining all caused Caucasian 
population of Hartford to drop to just 50 percent by 1970, from 90 
percent in 1950.10 Unique to Hartford and very few other cities was the 
pattern of continued immigration even with a shrinking pool of jobs. By 
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2010, 41 percent of the population of Hartford was Hispanic, illustrating 
the continued migration of peoples from Puerto Rico, Jamaica and 
other Caribbean islands.11 This wave of immigration alongside rapid 
deindustrialization caused major issues for the city, many of which 
still persist today. Areas that were once comfortably middle class 
and stood adjacent to industrial factories were now neighborhoods of 
poor immigrants next to abandoned warehouses.12 Also quite unique 
to Hartford was that during this time of mass deindustrialization 
and continued migration, the white-collar sector of the city continued 
to expand. Notably, the insurance industry remained and even 
grew, now offering jobs to an increasingly white and middle class 
metropolitan area.13 This gave Hartford an unconventional identity, 
one of an increasingly impoverished city with increasingly wealthy 
suburbs. In 1990, the United States Census ranked Hartford as the 
eighth poorest urban population in the United States, an evaluation 
that has not much changed in recent years.14
 Today, Hartford is a floundering city in a sea of wealthy suburbs. 
Hartford is the most impoverished part of what is otherwise the 
wealthiest state in the United States; 30 percent of the residents 
of Hartford lived under the poverty line in 2002.15 The city has a 
homeownership rate of 24.5 percent, making it the second lowest in the 
nation, behind Newark, New Jersey.16 Additionally, Hartford has lost 
45 percent of its property-tax base since 1990, causing the city 
government to lose a significant portion of its revenues.17 The 17 
square mile city is almost covered completely in half by untaxable 
property such as parks, churches, academic institutions and 
government property.18 Not surprisingly given the minimal amount 
of property taxes the city collects, Hartford’s education system is 
severely underperforming. Only 12.4 percent of the city’s population 
holds a bachelor’s degree, and perhaps even more shockingly, only 
61 percent of adults older than 25 have graduated high school.19 
Most of the problems that Hartford is currently experiencing can be 
traced back to the city’s loss of its major economic base, manufacturing. 
However, many point to the state’s lack of county government as 
one of the reasons why Hartford has not been able to bounce back 
the way many other post-industrial cities have. Because there is no 
county government, Hartford must use its own tax base, instead of 
being able to benefit from regional taxation and spending that would 
incorporate the wealth of the suburbs into Hartford itself. At the 
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same time, many still see Hartford’s wealthy suburbs as an advantage 
to be utilized in revitalization projects, suggesting that these wealthy 
suburbs have the power to transform Hartford into the bustling, 
thriving city it once was. 
 Detroit is perhaps the most well know American example of 
extreme deindustrialization and its crippling effects. However, the 
city also has a rich history and an industrial legacy that helped shape 
its urban form today. In early twentieth century Detroit, there was 
an explosion of entrepreneurship in the automotive industry.20 The 
city thrived off of this new industry, and the economy of Detroit soon 
centered on automobiles. Ford’s assembly lines took over, demanding 
only minimum human skill and plummeting production costs. The 
assembly line did not just produce cheaper cars; it also produced an 
industry that demanded little to no education.21 Not only did this 
new assembly line driven industry require less education of the city’s 
populace, it also caused the city to lose the small, competitive and 
independent firms that once dominated.22 Increasingly, these small 
firms gave way to massive corporations that took over the industry. By 
1955, the Detroit-Windsor metropolitan area was home to three of the 
five largest corporations on the planet.23 Dwindling education levels, 
combined with the loss of small, independent firms set Detroit up for 
future economic struggles. 
  Between 1950-1970, under the direction of the “Big Three” 
American automotive companies that virtually ran Detroit’s economy, 
Detroit was on the rise. In 1955, Detroit was home to three of the five 
largest corporations on the planet, General Motors, Ford and Chrysler, 
known as the “Big Three”.24 The population of the city peaked at 1.85 
million people in the mid twentieth century, and the economy was 
booming.25 However, the “Big Three” soon began to falter. As soon as 
1980, General Motors, Ford and Chrysler began to close down plants, 
shutting down as many as 128 from 1980 to 2012.26 These massive 
automobile corporations faltered for several reasons. Globalization is 
perhaps the most influential force in the decline of industry in Detroit. 
Firstly, the “Big Three” were unable to keep up with the technological 
innovation coming from Europe and Japan.27 Also stemming from 
global competition were increased production costs, as well as rising 
labor and health care costs.28 Detroit also lost many of its automotive 
jobs to overseas.29 In 2000, the “Big Three” employed 425,132 people 
in the United States and 249,622 people abroad.30 In 2010, the 
number of people employed by the “Big Three” in the United States 
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 had plummeted to 171,200, and the number of people employed 
abroad rose marginally to 276,800.31 These numbers illustrate not 
only the decline of the “Big Three” globally, but also illustrate the 
significant job loss in the United States, concentrated in the Detroit-
Windsor Metropolitan Area. Additionally, social unrest including 
racial tensions and strikes stemming from union negotiations affected 
not only the economic performance of the corporations but also 
contributed to the rising cost of production.32 It is clear that the 
automotive industry is declining, and with it Detroit’s economy is 
faltering. 
 In the first decade of the twenty-first century, Detroit’s population 
declined 24.9 percent.33 The employment rate of residents of the 
Detroit metropolitan area also declined by 21.3 percent, including a 
52.5 percent decline in manufacturing jobs from 488,000 to 
232,000.34 Due to an ineffective government, the city was turned 
over to over to Kevyn Orr, a bankruptcy lawyer from Washington, 
D.C. who was considered a state-appointed “emergency manager”. 35 
Orr, who was not an elected official, was charged with several tasks 
to help improve the city’s governance: restructuring the city’s debt, 
formulating a new budget, modifying union contracts, and selling 
city assets.36 When Orr took over, Detroit had $64 million dollars 
in cash but had an outstanding debt of $226 million.37 In July 2013, 
the emergency manager and the state governor declared Detroit 
bankrupt.38 The emergency manager’s report on the state of Detroit 
illustrated just how desperate the city had become. The police 
department was deemed “inefficient and ineffective” due to low 
response times and case closures, the public transit system failed 
to deliver reliable service, the public parks were unkempt and 
many headed for closure, and half the street lights in the city were 
broken.39 In addition, the number of business establishments in the 
city has plummeted, from about 23,500 in 1972 to about 8,300 in 
2002.40 The bottom line of the facts and figures illuminating Detroit’s 
current state of desperation is the simple truth that there are not 
enough jobs in the city, just 27 jobs per 100 residents.41 For this 
reason, it is likely the primary goal of revitalization strategies by the 
city of Detroit will be to bring more jobs to the area. 
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The Puzzle of Urban Reinvention: The Cases of Hartford 
and Detroit
 An understanding of the history of Detroit and Hartford illuminates 
the revitalization strategies each city has chosen to pursue. Both cities 
faced major deindustrialization after enjoying an age of prosperity 
driven by manufacturing. Now both cities must face their problems 
head on: impoverished residents, a shrinking tax base, and minimal 
job opportunities for the city residents. Both Hartford and Detroit 
have deployed urban reinvention strategies, some similar, some 
different. There are several different theories regarding urban 
redevelopment. One strategy of reinventing post-industrial cities is 
to redevelop the downtown of the city through investment, including 
building offices, hotels and entertainment centers.42 However, 
this strategy has its critics, who claim that focusing just on driving 
investment into the downtown does little to create sustainable 
economic growth, causes unequal distribution of resources and does 
not provide quality jobs to lift the residents out of poverty.43 Another 
strategy is for the city government to formulate policy that attracts 
investment, with tools such as tax breaks.44 Yet another strategy is 
more indirect, and involves reshaping the governance of the city in 
order to reinvigorate the city from the ground up.45 Both Hartford 
and Detroit have dabbled in each of these strategies, which represent 
just three of many. To varying degrees, the two cities have deployed 
projects based on these theories, in the hope that they will spur 
revitalization.  
 In its quest for urban renewal, Detroit has emphasized massive 
development projects with the goal that these projects will reconfigure 
and renew the fabric of the city. One of the most famous and 
prominent of these projects is the Renaissance Center, now called 
GM RENCEN. Around 1970, the chairman of Ford Henry Ford II had 
the idea to pool the resources of the car manufacturers in Detroit to 
help revitalize the city.46 Out of this idea rose Detroit Renaissance, a 
non-profit organization made up of 51 major corporations, including 
General Motors, Chrysler, American Motors, and B.F. Goodrich, all of 
which had substantial economic stake in the prosperity of Detroit.47 
Out of this band of corporations rose the idea for the Renaissance 
Center, a complex located on the Detroit riverfront. Designed by 
architect John Portman, this $337 million dollar complex includes a 
group of office buildings, shops and a massive hotel.48 The plans for the 
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center included a complex of residential buildings, which were never 
completed because the project ran out of funding.49 The idea for the 
Renaissance Center was to draw people back into downtown, to shop, 
eat at restaurants and spend their entertainment dollars.50 Its designers 
wanted to pull people out of the suburbs and into downtown, hoping 
that once residents experienced the benefits of the city, people would 
move back in from the suburbs, or at least spend more time and money 
downtown.51 However, even the driving force behind the center, Henry 
Ford II, admitted that the goal was for the project to be “primarily a 
catalyst to make other things happen” in downtown Detroit.52 
 To many, the Renaissance Center represents a failed attempt of 
urban renewal in Detroit. Even as the center was under construction, 
one of the major criticisms was that the $337 million dollars used to 
build the complex should have been spread around Detroit and used 
to invest in several smaller projects around the entire city.53 Charles 
Blessing, the director of the Detroit City Planning Commission in 
the 1970s when the center was being built, criticized the location, 
which he argued was isolated from the rest of downtown, isolated 
from the buildings near it on the riverfront, and did not flow with the 
architecture of the rest of the city.54 These criticisms, as well as many 
others, still ring true today. Many condemn the fortress-like feeling 
of the center, whose massive parking garages and easy access from 
the freeways clearly demonstrate the goal of attracting 
suburbanites.55 One of the primary issues of the Renaissance Center 
is the fact that it, if anything, simply draws people into downtown 
for a short amount of time, to shop or to eat. Many claim that if the 
center had included the residential constructions that were originally 
planned, the complex may have had much more success.56 Had people 
actually lived in and near the center, there may have been more 
demand for other businesses to open in the area, possibly slowly 
creating an actual rebirth of the downtown. Though the Renaissance 
Center by no means represents the consuming rebirth of Detroit it 
was meant to, it may still offer a glimmer of hope. The purchase of 
the center by General Motors to be used as its headquarters, as well 
as other similar investments of corporations looking to move from 
the suburbs back into downtown, could possibly be a part of the 
revitalization the Henry Ford II envisioned.57
 As the Renaissance Center suggests, Detroit has been attempting 
to move its economy away from manufacturing and towards an 
economy of consumption.58 To encourage a consumer economy, 
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Detroit has built several casinos, which hope to draw tourists and 
residents alike.59 The idea behind a casino and entertainment-
based economy is that casinos are a relatively easy and cheap way to 
circulate money, and are relatively inexpensive to run, since most 
employees earn low wages.60 Proponents of the casino strategy argue 
that casinos allow the city to become a magnet for tourism, which 
then creates demand for more hotels, restaurants and entertainment 
complexes, eventually revitalizing downtown.61 In November 1996, 
Michigan voters approved of Proposal E, which authorized the 
construction of a maximum of three casinos in downtown Detroit.62 
The first permanent casino built was MGM Grand, which took over 
several city blocks and included a hotel and a large shopping center 
and restaurant complex.63 Later came the Motor City Casino, which 
took over an abandoned Wonder Bread factory, with 75,000 square 
feet of gambling and entertainment space.64 Finally in 2000, the 
Greektown casino opened with its own hotel, theater and convention 
spaces.65 The casino initiative has met varied success, with many 
arguing that it has not revitalized downtown Detroit enough, while 
some argue that it has impacted some renewal and will continue to in 
the future. 
 The success of the casino initiative is still highly debated. In 2006, 
Detroit had the sixth highest annual revenue of casino markets in 
the United States, with revenue of over a billion dollars.66 However, 
there are several problems with the casino and entertainment based 
economy that Detroit hopes to become. Firstly, this kind of success 
can only be expected in times of economic prosperity. Second, these 
casinos are making profit from the residents of Detroit, who are as a 
whole impoverished.67 The relative success of the casino initiative, 
and the ability of the casinos to revitalize the city depend on the 
individual casino. The Greektown casino has been identified as 
probably the most successful in affecting the urban form around 
it.68 This success is due to the plan and structure of the casino itself. 
This is for a multitude of reasons, first of which is because the 
parking is located over a block from the actual casino, forcing patrons 
to walk through at least a small portion of the city.69 Also, all the 
restaurants are separate from the gambling areas and are also open 
at the street level.70 Lastly, there are several entrances and exits 
throughout the casino, which encourages patrons to go back and 
forth between the city and the casino itself.71 All of these 
unconventional designs allow for a positive synergy between the 
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casino and its neighborhood. Although casinos have the detriment 
of being susceptible to economic ups and downs, if more casinos are 
designed to interact with its neighborhood, they have the opportunity 
to truly revitalize Detroit.
 The economic issues facing Hartford are different from those 
facing Detroit. Hartford has a relatively strong economy, centered on 
insurance and other high skill industries. The issue with Hartford’s 
economy is its high levels of segregation; commuters fill over 83% 
of the 121,000 jobs, while 65% of the residents of Hartford commute 
outside the city for employment.72 Instead of trying to bring a whole 
new economy to the city, like in Detroit, the goal of Hartford’s urban 
renewal strategies is to revitalize its downtown into a 24-hour hub, 
rather than just a 9 to 5 city. The primary force behind this effort is the 
Capital Region Development Authority, whose mission is, among other 
things to “to stimulate economic development and new investment in 
and around Hartford, develop and redevelop property to attract and 
retain businesses, and rebrand and promote the district.”73 The Capital 
Region Development Authority is responsible for a multitude of 
renewal projects in Hartford, namely the Connecticut Convention 
Center, XL Center, Adriaen’s Landing and the Front Street District.74 
One of the most expansive of these projects is the Front Street 
District, which has the potential to catalyze the revitalization of 
downtown Hartford. 
 The site of the Front Street District had been in the works 
for decades. In 1988, New England Patriots owner Robert Kraft 
announced that Hartford would be the new home for the football 
team, however soon after these plans fell through.75 Regardless, the 
city and state governments of Hartford and Connecticut repurposed 
the land intended for use as the football stadium.76 Although the area 
lay dormant for some time, the Front Street District Area now is 
filled with restaurants, theaters, and residential areas.77 In addition, 
the University of Connecticut has plans to open a campus in 2017, 
which will be designed to intertwine with the city and have synergy 
with the nearby Hartford Public Library, Wadsworth Athenaeum, 
Connecticut Science Center and government buildings.78 The 
Front Street project also includes The Front Street Lofts, which will 
include 121 apartments with high-end amenities, located in close 
proximity to the restaurant and entertainment district, along with 
the University of Connecticut campus.79 Between the entertainment 
space, university campus, and apartment complex, it is likely that 
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the Front Street District in downtown Hartford will be successful, just 
how successful though, remains to be seen. 
The Urban Renewal of Hartford and Detroit: What Works and 
What Doesn’t?
 There is quite a bit of similarity in the strategies that Hartford 
and Detroit have taken to revitalize their downtowns. Though on 
a different scale, which is expected given the differing sizes of the 
two cities, both Detroit and Hartford have attempted to draw more 
people into their downtown through the creation of entertainment 
hubs. In addition, though both cities had the goal of renewing their 
downtown, the problems plaguing each city were slightly different, 
therefore producing slightly different goals. For example, Detroit’s 
goal in building the casinos was to spur a tourist and entertainment-
based economy for the city. Contrastingly, Hartford did not necessarily 
have the goal of creating another economy for the city, as insurance 
and other similar sectors of the economy are still strong. Instead, 
Hartford was more interested in becoming a 24-hour downtown, 
where people both work and live, instead of the commuter-heavy 
downtown that now exists. Because these renewal strategies are 
still in progress, both in Hartford and in Detroit, there is no 
determination of total success or failure. However, some projects have 
more of a potential to, or have already had success, in renewing their 
downtown. 
 The Renaissance Center and The Front Street District both 
attempted to bring people back from the suburbs into downtown. 
However, the Renaissance Center was largely considered a failure 
of urban renewal because it felt disconnected from the space around 
it, and failed to produce an integrated experience that encouraged 
visitors to experience the whole of downtown instead of just the 
center itself. In contrast, The Front Street District is an integrated 
and multi-dimensional project that includes both entertainment 
and residential space, which encourage people to both visit and 
live. It is likely that had the Renaissance Center included the 
residential dimension that was originally planned, the project would 
have been much more successful in revitalizing the area. Arguably 
the most successful casino in renewing the neighborhood around 
it is the Greektown Casino, which is designed to encourage visitors 
to interact with the outside as well. Though the Front Street 
District is still in still in progress, it is likely that because it includes 
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both residential and entertainment space, as well as a university 
campus, all of which interact organically with the city around it, the 
project will be successful in helping to renew downtown Hartford. 
Overall, drawing upon the urban renewal case studies in Hartford 
and Detroit, it is clear that the most successful urban renewal 
strategies encourage both tourists and residents to interact organically 
with the city around them. 
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